Introduction
SWOT
Analysis of Daesh (ISIS)
· Strengths
· Weaknesses
· Opportunities
· Threats
Summary
Introduction
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Today, this
instability plagues the heart of the Middle East, stretching across Iraq,
Syria, and Lebanon and encompassing the border regions of northern Jordan and
southern Turkey. While the militarization of the Syrian revolution from
mid-2011 has played a critical role in destabilizing the region, an actor whose
roots lie primarily in Iraq has come to pose the most significant risk to its
long-term stability. (Chula, 2014)
On June 29,
2014, the first day of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, Islamic State in Iraq
and al-Sham (ISIS) spokesman Taha Subhi Falaha (Abu Muhammad al-Adnani)
announced the restoration of the caliphate under the leadership of Ibrahim
Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarra’iyy (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi). Adnani
declared the group would henceforth be known as the Islamic State (IS) and
Baghdadi as Caliph Ibrahim. This bold move came just weeks after ISIS seized
Iraq’s second city of Mosul on June 10, thereby inflaming the armed Sunni
uprising against the government of Nuri al-Maliki. Meanwhile, ISIS was also on
the offensive in eastern Syria and consolidating its hold over the area
surrounding the group’s capital northern city of Raqqa. After that the
So-called “Caliph Ibrahim” made his first public appearance on July 4, IS
controlled territory stretching from al-Bab in Syria’s Aleppo governorate to
Suleiman Bek in Iraq’s Salah ad Din province that is over 400 miles away.
ISIS likely
retained assets of at least $875 million prior to seizing Mosul. Judging by the
scale of American-made Iraqi military equipment captured in June and that IS
was assessed to be earning $2 million per day by smuggling oil from Iraq and
Syria. According to a September estimate, IS worth is close to $2 billion. This
impressively managed; almost obsessively bureaucratic organization has become a
serious threat to regional and international security. In fundamentally
challenging al-Qaeda’s place as the recognized leader of transnational
jihadism, it continues to attract recruits from across the globe. The scale of
this threat has been demonstrated by the initiation of airstrikes by a broad international
coalition in Iraq and Syria in recent months. While IS has shifted underground,
it continues operations in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, its beheading of foreign
hostages has presented a concerning element of leverage over the international
community’s ability to counter its influence. (Chula, 2014)
This paper is
consisted on the SWOT analysis of Daesh (ISIS). This paper seeks to provide an
in-depth analytical profile of IS and it’s various predecessors—something that
is lacking in contemporary open sources.
SWOT Analysis of
Daesh (ISIS)
Strengths
· By
mid-October 2014 ISIS likely commanded fighters about 31,000, it approximated
that 20,000-25,000 of which are core, ideologically loyal full-time members.
Through its capacity to sustain offensive momentum, IS has turned into a
versatile Jihadist organization, operating simultaneously as a terrorist,
insurgent, and light infantry force. But, more importantly, had
accumulated considerable territorial control. It possesses a number of weapons
systems and vehicles, it possesses a number of weapons systems and vehicles
that includes armored personnel carriers, tanks, field artillery, and
multiple-rocket launchers, self-propelled howitzers, as well as anti-aircraft
guns. An assortment of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs),
· Backed
by extreme ideological determination, IS militants have exploited local
dynamics and an environment of instability to serve their own ends. Through
direct and indirect intimidation insurgent, guerrilla warfare, and more
orthodox large-scale military assaults on multiple axes, IS has proven a
militant force capable of defeating national armies and rival insurgent
factions.
· IS
has evolved into a highly bureaucratic organization focused on earning a
sufficient income to finance widespread governance initiatives. Its focus on
maintaining financial independence—in comparison to the traditional al-Qaeda
model of relying on external donors and financiers—has induced the group to
develop multiple sources of income, including oil, gas extortion, kidnapping
for ransom, , agriculture, taxation, black market antique selling, and other
illicit trades. By September 2014, IS was earning approximately $2 million per
day, making it the wealthiest terrorist organization in the world. (Johnson,
2014)
· If
the group can survive strikes, its manpower and weaponry will sustain offensive
operational capabilities into the long-term. However, this will also depend on
IS operating as an organization of well-trained, ideologically motivated, and
ruthless fighters rather than a ragtag group of militiamen. In this respect, IS
has long-implemented policies aimed at professionalizing its members. The
number of training camps appears to have increased since 2013, and an
examination of the groups’ social media output reveals that IS has been operating
such camps in most sizeable municipalities under its control, both in Syria and
Iraq. (Johnson, 2014)
· Independent
of specific local dynamics, IS has proven capable of designing and implementing
a multi-stage strategy aimed at engendering a chaotic power vacuum into which
it can enter. Combining a typical insurgent strategy of attrition with extreme
brutality (such as the execution of approximately 200 men captured at Tabaqa
Airbase in late August), ISIS is able to acquire the leverage necessary to
become locally dominant. (Johnson, 2014)
Weaknesses
· The
big weakness of the ISIS is that their economy is considered facinating.IS
extraordinary access to oil fields has been primarily presented as strength.
However, the reality is that ISIS’ reliance for its fragility on oil could be
dangerous and, and the so-called caliphate could already be close to economic
collapse. According to reports at the beginning of the summer, ISIS had been
making anywhere between $2 million and $3 million per day in illegal oil sales.
This was a shockingly high figure – but experts who are at the Iraqi Oil
Report, and many others, have already begin to doubt it – telling the
Washington Post earlier this month the actual earnings could now be as low as
$250,000 per day. The Qaiyara and Najmah oil fields arranged simply south of Mosul
and now under ISIS control, were considered of such low quality that when the
Iraqi government opened them up for offering in 2009, the main organization to
place an offer, the Angolan Sonangol, was honored around $6 every barrel, one
of the most astounding extraction charges granted in Iraq. Security
contemplations likewise helped the high cost, and Sonangol hauled out in the
not so distant future when the oil fields got to be so risky there is no option
work. ISIS has taken its place, pumping oil whose quality is supposedly near to
bitumen. Close-by, the Ain Zalah and Butmah oil fields have now been retaken by
Kurdish warriors. ISIS burnt the Ain Zalah oil field a month ago when it
withdrew from that point.
· While
ISIS still holds fields in Syria, the general value every barrel is
disintegrating. There will dependably be a runner or tricky oil wholesaler
content to purchase ISIS oil at $40 every barrel, or even as low as $25.
Nonetheless, such costs are $50-65 underneath the business sector rate. ISIS is
additionally offering oil which accompanies a powerful hazard appended, making
the employment of the brokers much harder. (Nico Prucja, 2014)
· Specialists needed
to pump oil aren't as promptly accessible. Over the mid-year, they had either
been constrained or paid to stay and work the oil fields. Anyway as Western
consideration has focused in, and the severity of ISIS has expanded, they are
leaving – and with it their greatly required skill. Iraq itself, obviously, is
harming from the loss of those oil fields, as is Syria. However not at all like
ISIS, the Iraqi and Syrian governments have the capacity to tap into crisis
financing from worldwide contributors, and to some degree worldwide monetary
markets. ISIS does not have these choices. On the off chance that it needs to
capacity as a legitimate state, it will need to exist exclusively on the
generally little totals gave by private Gulf funders, or raise cash inside.
Iraq's administration a year ago used about $120 billion, ISIS would discover
difficult to match. ISIS may be a rich terrorist association, yet it is a poor
country. Perceiving this basic shortcoming is key to seeing how it could fall. (Nico
Prucja, 2014)
· Already
we're beginning to see weak holes. The presence of an assessment, or blackmail,
framework isn't an indication of a country being conceived; it’s an indication
of a money stream issue. Kidnappings and payoff installments are on the ascent.
For another nation that is probably so rich, engaging for trusts on online
networking isn't a sign of monetary certainty. The monetary delicacy of the
ISIS substance is adjusted against its political delicacy – its dependence on
the Sunni tribes and fighters. ISIS is policing a populace of up to 5 million
with only 25,000 of its own soldiers. Certainly, those Sunni tribes have
political grievances with Baghdad, and ISIS can depend on their backing, for
now. Be that as it may how eager will they be once they understand that ISIS
can't accommodate them, on top of the disintegrating common freedoms they are
persisting? How dependable will they remain if the economy falls? (Nico
Prucja, 2014)
Opportunities
· IS’s
expansion in Iraq and Syria has benefited greatly from tremendous regional
instability and the weakening of nation-state borders. By exploiting and
exacerbating such conditions, IS has been able to a multiplying international
membership, gain military power, and unprecedented financial resources. Region
is de-stabling day by day, so ISIS sees the opportunity for consolidation.
· IS’s
predecessor organizations survived the might of the U.S. military and a
well-resourced tribal-based uprising and today, the socio-political conditions
it faces are profoundly more favorable. The organization’s five-step
process—hijra (migration), jama‘a (congregate), destabilize taghut (tyrants),
tamkin (consolidation), and khilafa (caliphate)—has now been completed. The
most significant challenge that remains is to successfully consolidate and
govern what could now amount to a proto-state without falling victim to its own
ideology. (Nour Malas, 2014)
· IS’s
ability to sustain military momentum will prove key to its future success and
recruiting. Thus far, strikes have been advancing a containment strategy rather
than an offensive one against IS power and territorial control. Indigenous
forces in both Iraq and Syria have proven largely incapable of launching
serious counter-offensives that can capitalize on international strikes. If
this situation continues, it seems likely IS will seek to shift to a strategy
of consolidation.
· In
order to expand its operations, particularly to the south, IS could seek to
exploit growing frustration within the Syrian opposition, particularly amongst
those who had chosen to retain links to Western-backed structures in Jordan and
Turkey. (Nour Malas, 2014)
Threats
· In
Iraq, IS will likely seek to continue destabilizing social dynamics and to
enforce a perception within the (Johnson, 2014) (Johnson, 2014) (Johnson,
2014) (Johnson, 2014) Sunni community that Haider al-Abadi’s new
government does not defend their rights. In Iraq in particular, ISIS is deeply
dependent on fueling instability and conflict in order to maintain its various
marriages of convenience with other Sunni factions, without whom it would
struggle to maintain sufficient legitimacy.
· For
Syria, the existing policy of bolstering moderate opposition groups—through the
provision of training, weaponry, and intelligence—can be accelerated and
expanded. The groups can be shaped around a more representative “national army”
or a unified Hay’at al-Arkan (General Staff Command) based inside Syria. Such a
body would realistically have the potential to defeat IS. (Prothero, 2014)
· This
could be exploited for military and intelligence purposes. The significant
expansion of the Irbil CIA station is a threatening step forward in this
respect for ISIS. In both Syria and Iraq, a broad strategy could be built,
developed and implemented that explicitly targets IS’s most significant
strengths, specifically its revenue stream, the mobility of its forces, its
effective leadership and command structure, its use of social media, and
ongoing regional instability.
· Much
of IS’s income is earned through the illicit production, refining, and sale of
oil. The targeting of the resources themselves—which began in late September.
From Internal community, a strategy could be to target the transportation
infrastructure used to truck the oil to customers. This cold cut off key nodes
of IS communication and command and control. An expansion and intensification
of existing international sanctions targeting those who may purchase or
transfer IS-linked oil and other financial resources could similarly enacted. (Prothero,
2014)
· In
addition to neutralizing key transport routes, a focus may be placed upon
targeting IS’s ground mobility capabilities, captured armored vehicles
particularly fleets of pick-up trucks. ISIS is still a comparatively small
military organization, commanding approximately 25,000-30,000 fighters in Syria
and Iraq. Its consistent expansion is dependent upon continued military
success, which by extension is dependent upon this mobility. Crucially, this
may be a strategy carried out by local persons which are supported by extensive,
airpower, air surveillance, and the provision of additional military training
and equipment, particularly armor-piercing recoilless rifles and ATGMs.
· A
concerted intelligence-led operation may be initiated at the local level by
local actors with the objective of collecting information on the identity and areas
of operation of IS’s senior leadership and military command structures. This
intelligence effort then may be fed into existing military operations against
IS, led by both international air assets and by local actors on the ground. A
sustained erosion of IS’s experienced leadership structure may make the group
more vulnerable to military ground maneuvers by rival groups in Syria and, if
established, in Iraq. It can eliminate ISIS leadership. (Prothero, 2014)
· An
aggressive countering of IS’s presence on social media began in mid-August
2014, with positive effect—this may be continued. While deleting all
IS-affiliated accounts on social media removes an extremely valuable source of
intelligence, consistent pressure would be sufficient in and of itself.
Moreover, the organization’s religion-political doctrine could be challenged
and its motivations undermined through the emplacement of “mole”
accounts—managed by government-paid individuals with extensive knowledge of
Islamic creed and jurisprudence—within the jihadi community online
· ISIS
feeds off instability and perceptions of victimization, repression, and
humiliation. By removing such conditions, IS would soon find itself a fish out
of water. Regarding Syria, the international community may recognize that
President Assad does not represent a unifying leader for his country. Syria is
a complex multi-sectarian and multiethnic state with a significant
“middle-ground,” which so far remains relatively unengaged within the conflict.
By replacing the binary image of opposition versus government with a focus on
maintaining Syrian territorial integrity and social unity through national
dialogue and engagement, the international community may encourage a peaceful
solution in Syria. This would potentially be acceptable to Iran and Russia,
but, crucially, will have to involve the eventual resignation or replacement of
Assad. In Iraq, political progress already underway in Baghdad may be built
upon and local Sunni actors or factors, including actors those who are involved
in armed actions, may be gradually engaged and drawn back into the national
fold. The capacity of the government and its various structures to maintain a
unified state whose constitution recognizes the equal rights of all communities
may be reinforced. (Prothero, 2014)
Summary
Intense turmoil
in Syria and Iraq in recent years has created socio-political vacuums in which
jihadi groups have been able to thrive. Most notable in this respect has been
the rise to prominence of the Islamic State (IS), previously known as the
Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).
After IS
declared the establishment of a caliphate stretching across 423 miles of Syria
and Iraq on June 29, 2014 the apparent danger posed by the group (IS) has led
to the initiation of air and cruise missile strikes against IS targets in Iraq
and northern Syria in August 2014. While led by the United States, this ongoing
intervention has been a coalition initiative, involving local, regional, and
international states opposed to IS’s existence. (Rogin, 2014)
Although
currently centered within Syria and Iraq, IS’s roots lie in Jordan and
Afghanistan and date back to at least 1999. However, IS has evolved
considerably since then, transforming from a small and loosely structured body
with broad international ambitions to a vast organization focused on governing
as an Islamic state across nation state boundaries.
Throughout this
15-year period, IS and its various predecessors have undergone a significant
process of operational and organizational learning. While a first attempt at
Islamic state building in 2006-2008 proved overzealous and alienating, a second
attempt from 2013 onwards has proven more sustainable, although concerted
international intervention begun in 2014 will pose a serious challenge to its
success. If you see the scenario you have to say that IS is more successful
than Al-Qaida or any other group. (Rogin, 2014)
IS should be
assessed and countered as representing a more advanced threat than a simple
terrorist organization. Its main objective which is visual is to establish an
Islamic Khilafat. IS has attached its ability to rule and govern as a
determinant of success. If you look in a broader context, the instability and
conflict, IS’s combination of tough law and repression with the provision of
key services and assistance has at times led to a measure of tacit acceptance
on a local level.
IS maintains
ambitious objectives in both Syria and Iraq, and since the start of coalition strikes,
IS has openly encouraged attacks in the West by its supporters or members.
Moreover, an expansion of IS operations into other Middle Eastern states,
including Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey should not be discounted.
Continuing pledges of allegiance from existing jihadi factions around the world
underline the influence IS exerts within the international jihadi community.
While IS will
always be a terrorist organization at its most basic level, its effective
attempt at establishing a proto-state across Syria and Iraq has demonstrated
the scale of its goals and capabilities. By expanding amidst a tremendous wave
of regional instability and by exploiting and exacerbating such conditions, IS
successfully gained multiplying international membership, military power, and
unprecedented financial resources. The key to undermining IS’s long-term
sustainability, therefore it is the necessity of the hour to solve within its
areas of operation the socio-political failures. (Rogin, 2014)
More immediately,
local, regional and international states can adopt a series of policies aimed
at:
1) To fund the
provision of governance and social services to civilians; it is necessary
countering IS’s financial strength and ability
2) For military
mobility and the rapid re-deployment of manpower; neutralize IS’s capacity
3) It is necessary
to collect and acting on intelligence relating to IS’s s military command, senior
leadership and control structure;
4) It is also necessary
to weaken and delegalize IS’s effective use of social media for information
operations and recruitment; and (Rogin, 2014)
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